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Chapter 4
Social And Cultural Awareness and
Responsibility in Library, Information
and Documentation Studies
Birger Hjørland
Abstract
This paper will try to demonstrate that knowledge concerning social and
cultural awareness and responsibility (SCAR) is not opposed to efficiency in
information systems development. On the contrary, such knowledge is a pre-
requisite for developing effective systems. An information system is sup-
posed to provide relevant information and help fulfil the “information needs”
of users and potential users.The concepts of “relevance” and "information
needs” in information science should be defined in a way that reflects social
responsibility. Approaches that are not open to consider SCAR in user needs
and relevance criteria cannot be regarded as being efficient.
Questions related to SCAR are not only relevant for the methodology of
information science as a research discipline, but involve—more or less—all
kinds of knowledge production. Some theories of knowledge deny this thesis
about the role of values, goals, and consequences in scientific activities,
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while other epistemologies approve it. The hermeneutic insight, that there is
no neutral platform from which knowledge can be evaluated, implies that
the seemingly neutral epistemologies are wrong: they are never neutral,
they just do not acknowledge and discuss their basis, values, and conse-
quences. Epistemological questions should never remain invisible or un-
conscious.
Social Responsibility As A Scientific Criterion
In traditional thinking issues relating to values, policies, goals, and con-
sequences are seen as contradictory to scientific methods and objectivity.
As Heine Andersen (1, p. 87) points out:
Following Hume’s “gulf doctrine” (2, p. 470), Moore’s analysis of the
naturalistic fallacy (3), and Weber’s demand for value freedom (4, p.
149), the social sciences wanted to become value free and neutral re-
garding any political or moral positions, just like the hard sciences.
Any footprints left in scientific results and theories from political and
moral viewpoints were considered signs of error, which should be elimi-
nated by strict observance of methodological rules for testing and inter-
subjective control.
This paper will put some arguments against this received view. I’ll argue
that problems in library and information science cannot be regarded as
neutral, and thus cannot be researched properly by methodologies that
claim neutrality and value-freedom. This is mainly due to issues related
to concepts such as “user needs” and “relevance” and also to the basic
teleological nature of information systems. I’ll also put forward the more
far-reaching claim that the social sciences and probably all sciences at
their deepest levels rest on pragmatic and ethical arguments.
These claims may sound excessive. It is important to understand,
however, that they are not implying methodological relativism or meth-
odological anarchism (like, for example, the view put forward by
Feyerabend, 5). Scientific methods are important, and some methods are
simply better than others to certain tasks. The claim of the importance of
pragmatic and ethical criteria is not the denial of the important role of
observations, experiments, logic, mathematics, and related empirical and
rationalistic means of scientific proof. It would be extremely unscientific
to uphold a knowledge claim against hard evidence of such kinds. In the
final analysis this would make science meaningless and superfluous, be-
cause any decision could as well be justified politically without proper
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scientific investigation. In the view of pragmatic philosophy this is sim-
ply not a proper pragmatic solution. (The pragmatic philosophers, such
as John Dewey, argued for basic research, not just for applied research.
This is important to understand because this use of pragmatism is op-
posed to more common-sense views of what pragmatism is).
The only reason why pragmatic criteria may be accepted rests on the
view or insight that knowledge never has an absolutely sure basis. Knowl-
edge cannot be deduced from an absolutely secure foundation of obser-
vations or logical intuitions. There is no final proof, for example, that
atoms exist. In the beginning of the 19th century there was a debate whether
they existed or whether they were simply models that scientists used to
explain their observations. According to Ess (6) pragmatism answered
the question about the existence of such matters with a hypothetical state-
ment: there are atoms in the universe if positing their existence in an
optimal way simplifies and renders fertile our sensory experiences as well
as our theoretical reflections on them as compared to what would result if
we did not posit their existence. In other words; there are atoms if the
atom-hypothesis “works”. Nature, after all, pushes back against our theo-
rizing, and if a hypothesis fails to do the work for us that we want it to do,
i.e., explain and predict or accurately describe reality, that is a rational
ground for becoming suspicious that the hypothesis might be based on
problematic ontological assumptions.
Today it would in my mind be foolish to claim that atoms do not
exist. Not because of any single experiment or observation in the history
of science, but because their existence is verified in so many different
ways and in the end because our whole culture is today based on a tech-
nology that takes this claim for granted. In this way the final criteria of
knowledge claims are related to their utility in a broader, ecological per-
spective.
It is important to realize that our knowledge claims are built in theo-
retical systems of mutual dependencies. The more fundamental a claim
is, the stronger evidence should be demanded of the person who proposes
it. Scientific methods imply in themselves knowledge claims about the
proper way of carrying out investigations, such as the claim, for example,
that experimental methods are the best way to obtain knowledge. Like
other kinds of knowledge claims, they are partly based on experience and
rational intuition. In the end, however, they also rest on pragmatic argu-
ments concerning the aims of research. Basic research (as opposed to
applied research) is not directly aimed at some pragmatic purpose. How-
ever, science as a cultural phenomenon has during history proved its prag-
matic value for societies, and certainly modern societies expect to have a
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return for their investment in basic science. It is almost a paradox that the
search for truth regardless of pragmatic interests has proved that this is in
the larger perspective the best way to solve pragmatic problems, that can-
cer, for example, is better fought by pure research revealing the nature of
normal and abnormal growth in cells than by trying one cure after an-
other.
The primary social responsibility for scientists is the search for truth.
The search for truth implies active work for the freedom of proposing and
investigating theories and hypothesis. Although research cannot be free
from different kinds of interests, scientific research presupposes the will-
ingness to accept inquiries and arguments that are in opposition to one’s
narrow interests. It also involves the obligation to defend the freedom
and the seriousness of scientific communication and the readiness to ques-
tions one’s own assumptions and to help others to question one’s own
assumptions (and certainly not try to prevent criticism).
A serious threat to the quality of and responsibility for research is
connected to available time limits. When researchers are working under
stress (or are lazy ) they cannot properly examine the methods, theories,
concepts and findings on which their own work depend. In such cases
they claim a false expertise and may indirectly be responsible for dis-
seminating and supporting false knowledge, for developments along blind
alleys, and possibly for suggesting solutions that are harmful rather than
beneficial for the users of research. In this way serious and hard work
also is a moral obligation for scientists.
Why Observations Are Not Evidence Enough
Empiricism and (logical) positivism are epistemologies and philosophies
of science, which claim that all knowledge is based on experiences and
observations. It follows that all knowledge claims should be verifiable by
observations. It also follows that general knowledge claims are based on
induction from a pool of single observations and that our complex con-
cepts are composed of primitive concepts, which are based on perception
of simple physical properties.
The American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars (1912-1989) maintained
that classical empiricism is a myth based on the doctrine of the given (7,
p. 828). Contrary to the classical foundational views of empiricism and
rationalism, the modern views in the philosophy of science emphasize
the interdependency between observations and theoretical frameworks,
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the specific problems addressed and the research methods used. As Lloys
writes:
Perhaps the greatest advance in understanding the nature of explana-
tion made in the post-positivist and post-Kuhnian era is the general
realization that methodologies, theories, and explanations are related to
each other via extra-logical, historically variable constellations vari-
ously described as “background knowledge,” “traditions,”  “paradigms,”
“research programs,” “fields,” or “domains.”  We can call all of these
“framework concepts.” (8, p. 32)
In order to illustrate the insufficiency of observations, a hypothetical story
by Imre Lakatos is relevant:
The story is about an imaginary case of planetary misbehavior. A physi-
cist of the pre-Einsteinian era takes Newton’s mechanics and his law of
gravitation, (N), the accepted initial conditions, I, and calculates, with
their help, the path of a newly discovered small planet, p. But the planet
deviates from the calculated path. Does our Newtonian physicist con-
sider that the deviation was forbidden by Newton’s theory and there-
fore that, once established, it refutes the theory N? No. He suggests that
there must be a hitherto unknown planet p´ which perturbs the path of
p. He calculates the mass, orbit, etc., of this hypothetical planet and
then asks an experimental astronomer to test his hypothesis. The planet
p´ is so small that even the biggest available telescopes cannot possible
observe it: the experimental astronomer applies for a research grant to
build yet a bigger one. In three years’ time the new telescope is ready.
Were the unknown planet p´ to be discovered, it would be hailed as a
new victory of Newtonian science. But it is not. Does our scientist aban-
don Newton’s theory and his idea of the perturbing planet? No. He
suggests that a cloud of cosmic dust hides the planet from us. He calcu-
lates the location and properties of this cloud and asks for a research
grant to send up a satellite to test his calculations. Were the satellite’s
instruments (possibly new ones, based on a little-tested theory) to record
the existence of the conjectural cloud, the result would be hailed as an
outstanding victory for Newtonian science. But the cloud is not found.
Does our scientist abandon Newton’s theory, together with the idea of
the perturbing planet and the idea of the cloud, which hides it? No. He
suggests that there is some magnetic field in that region of the universe,
which disturbed the instruments of the satellite. A new satellite is sent
up. Were the magnetic field to be found, Newtonians would celebrate a
sensational victory. But it is not. Is this regarded as a refutation of
Newtonian science? No. Either yet another ingenious auxiliary hypoth-
esis is proposed or . . . the whole story is buried in the dusty volumes of
periodicals and the story never mentioned again. (9, pp. 100–101).
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A similar insight has been given by Duhem (10) regarding the role of
experiments in science. While Bacon (11) claimed that a ‘crucial experi-
ment’ establishes the truth of one of a set of competing theories and that
such experiments in the empirical sciences are particularly important for
terminating an investigation, Duhem denied these claims. He maintained
that crucial experiments are impossible in the physical sciences because
they require a complete enumeration of all possible theories to explain a
phenomenon—something that cannot be achieved. However, despite
Duhem’s argument, scientists frequently regard certain experiments as
crucial in the sense that the experimental result helps make one theory
among a set of competitors very probable and the others very improb-
able, given what is currently known. Duhem’s argument is, however, a
weakening of the empiricist position and emphases the role of other meth-
ods than just pure experiences. Duhem’s view was supported by the phi-
losopher, W.V.O. Quine, and “the Quine-Duhem thesis” states that any
seemingly disconfirming observational evidence can always be accom-
modated to any theory.
The relevance of observations is not given, but is determined by theo-
retical questions in the research field. A. F. Chalmers writes in his presen-
tation of Kuhn’s theory about scientific paradigms:
A normal scientist must be uncritical of the paradigm in which he works.
It is only by being so that he is able to concentrate his efforts on the
detailed articulation of the paradigm and to perform the esoteric work
necessary to probe nature in depth. It is the lack of disagreement over
fundamentals that distinguish mature, normal science from the rela-
tively disorganized activity of immature pre-science. According to Kuhn,
the latter is characterized by total disagreement and constant debate
over fundamentals, so much that it is impossible to get down to de-
tailed, esoteric work. There will be almost as many theories as there are
workers in the field and each theoretician will be obliged to start afresh
and justify his own particular approach. Kuhn offers optics before New-
ton as an example. There was a wide diversity of theories about the
nature of light from the time of the ancients up to Newton. No general
agreement was reached and no detailed, generally accepted theory
emerged before Newton proposed and defended his particle theory. Not
only did the rival theorists of the pre-science period disagree over fun-
damental theoretical assumptions but also over the kinds of observa-
tional phenomena that were relevant to their theories. Insofar as Kuhn
recognizes the role played by a paradigm in guiding the search for and
interpretation of observable phenomena, he accommodates most of what
I have described as the theory-dependence of observation in Chapter 3.
(12, p. 92, emphasis in original)
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If observations are not enough, if they are not just given but depend on
theoretical assumptions and frameworks, then theories and observations
become interwoven in systems of mutual interdependence. As a conse-
quence questions related to social factors in science, values in science,
and pragmatic factors in theory acceptance have become important in the
philosophy of science (see e.g. 13, 14, 15).
Specific questions are formulated on the basis of historical knowl-
edge of what has previously been successful strategies. They are also
formulated with considerations about what is practicable and what will
be accepted and appreciated. Of course the individual researcher will be
influenced by his own competencies and evaluations. A central question
is whether there are connections between narrow scientific discourses
and broader social and political discourses. Are there connections be-
tween scientific problem-formulations, arguments, findings, and those
pragmatic and political questions that the received view sees as antitheti-
cal to science?
Political Views on Truth:
The Concept of Ideology
Truth has political consequences and so has research. Some people or
groups of people may wish to hide certain truths because the publication
of them would harm their interests. They may or may not have the power
to determine whether research in such questions should be stopped or
avoided. In some cases people have the power simply to repress the truth,
to disseminate propaganda in favor of their own views or simply to pro-
duce fraud (16). In many cases, however, things are subtler, and people in
power may, for example, think that the propaganda they disseminate is
the truth. People in power will very often try to argue that their views and
explanations are the best ones, and that their way of being informed makes
their judgments better.
The word ideology was first used just after the French Revolution by
Antonine Destutt de Tracy (17, p. 1–4). He was one of a group of philoso-
phers whom the revolutionary Convention put in charge of the newly
founded Institut de France to spread the ideas of the Enlightenment. Na-
poleon briefly supported the Institut until his personal despotism made
such support inconvenient for advancing his own power and policies. De
Tracy rejected both “innate ideas,” whether from God or biology as well
as “established authority” whether religion or the state, as the sources
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and foundation of knowledge. One can say that de Tracy was arguing that
what we think and how we act is due to our upbringing and environment,
to our interaction with the physical and social world. This view leads to
the belief that, given the right environments, anyone can think and act as
a responsible and intelligent citizen, and that, therefore, democracy is
both a just and a workable form of government.
The notion of ideology was thus positive and progressive in its ori-
gin, but Napoleon quickly came to see matters differently, and the term
came to be pejorative. As Napoleon’s government evolved towards an
empire supported by established religion, he faced inevitable criticism
from liberals and republicans, people who wanted a democratically based
republic, not a despotic emperor. Napoleon attacked the Enlightenment
proponents of democracy, charging that they mislead the people by el-
evating them to a sovereignty they were incapable of exercising. Napo-
leon blamed these “ideologues” as he called them, for his defeat in Russia.
The Enlightenment philosophers had wanted to found a just system
of government on a study of how human beliefs, needs and desires are
shaped by various physical and social environments. Napoleon refers to
this idea as “clouded metaphysics.” For him, a system of government
should be founded not on social theorizing, but rather on “knowledge of
the human heart and . . . the lessons of history.” It does not really matter
what this vague phrase meant, since we know perfectly well what view
Napoleon defended: the need for controlling, despotic, and imperial power
in his own hands as emperor.
Gee (17) calls this form of argument “Napoleon’s move” and sees it
as exemplary in terms of one key way in which the term ideology has
been used ever since in attacks on views one does not like. Napoleon
used “ideology” as a term of abuse for a social policy which was in part
or in whole derived from a social theory in a conscious way.
Napoleon’s belief was explained by Karl Marx by Napoleon’s posi-
tion at the top of a particular social structure and his will to retain and
enhance his power within that structure. According to Marx, it is the fail-
ure of the powerful in a society to realize that their views of reality follow
from, and support, their positions of power, that creates ideology. Ideol-
ogy is an “upside-down” version of reality. Things are not really the way
the elite believe them to be; rather their beliefs invert reality to make it
appear the way they would like it to be. Marx’s move underscores the
point that there is no escape from theory. The real question is: “What
theories ought we to believe in and act on?” not “Whose experience is
best?” since this latter question can only be answered on the basis of
some theory. This does not, however, imply, as Marx stated, that anyone
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who disagreed with his particular theory are simply engaged in “false
consciousness”.
It is a tendency of human beings to perceive their own benefits as
being natural and to agree with findings, theories, ideas, methodologies
etc. that confirm the legacy of those benefits. There is a tendency to sup-
port ideas, ideologies, and theories that are beneficial. Such mechanisms
are very often unconscious. Psychological research has shown that people
tend to collect information that verifies their beliefs and to neglect infor-
mation that contradicts their beliefs (see e.g., 18). This is also true for
scientific research and “paradigms.” One famous case is the discovery of
Sir Cyril Burt’s research flaws which revealed that the scientific commu-
nity sharing Burt’s view about the importance of the genetic factor in
intelligence ignored the fact that Burt’s publications did not fulfilled fun-
damental requirements of sound scientific methodology (19).
Professional communities may be narrow in their perception and
understanding of specific kinds of problems. That is why some groups
are working for broader recruiting into important jobs such as university
teachers/professors, directors of firms, and members of political parties
and parliaments. The philosophy behind this endeavor is that a broader
recruitment regarding gender, social class, and other characteristics can
ensure more democratic decisions, broader collective horizon, broader
criteria on what counts as quality, and in the end also better quality in the
decisions that are made.
We may conclude this section by stating that there are obviously dif-
ferent groups in society with different interests in what kind of knowl-
edge should be produced and disseminated. Such groups tend to develop
different views and ideologies. The most dominant views tend to support
the most influential and powerful groups. Each view tends to provide
arguments in favor of itself and to dismiss other views as merely “ideol-
ogy.” An important part of such argument is that a certain view is true
because it is based on a certain method (e.g., a privileged form of obser-
vation or a privileged form of interpretation). The political battle moves
one step up to questions of scientific methods and epistemologies.
The Political Roles of Epistemologies,
Methodologies, and Philosophies of Science
There exist many research methods, many textbooks, many knowledge
claims, and many theories about the best way to obtain knowledge. Such
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theories tend to be connected to a “Zeitgeist.” Today the word “post-
modernism” is widely used in this context and is also applied to research
methods. In the 1970s, forms of Marxism and critical theory were influ-
ential. Before that logical positivism and empiricism were commonly used.
(The main bulk of research may, however, remain totally unaffected by
theoretical discourses on research and methods).
Epistemologies can be seen as interpretations and generalizations of
(successful) scientific research. Classical empiricism and classical ratio-
nalism were two competing interpretations of the scientific method fol-
lowing the scientific revolution inaugurated by Copernicus and con-
summated by Newton. Those epistemologies tried to establish a secure
basis for obtaining knowledge. They were foundational theories: seeking
a firm foundation and secure procedures for obtaining knowledge.
In my own interpretation, epistemological theories may be classified
according to their preferred information sources:
Simplified relevance criteria in four epistemological schools
(From Hjørland, 20)
Empiricism
Relevant:
Observations,
sense-data.
Induction from
collections of
observational data.
Intersubjectively
controlled data.
Non-relevant:
Speculations,
knowledge
transmitted from
authorities. “Book
knowledge”
(“reading nature,
not books”). Data
about the
observers’
assumptions and
pre-understanding.
Rationalism
Relevant: Pure
thinking, logic,
mathematical
models, computer
modeling, systems
of axioms,
definitions and
theorems.
Low priority is
given to empirical
data because such
data must be
organized in
accordance with
principles which
cannot come from
experience.
Historicism
Relevant:
Background
knowledge about
pre-understanding,
theories, concep-
tions, contexts,
historical
developments and
evolutionary
perspectives.
Low priority is
given to
decontextualized
data of which the
meanings cannot
be interpreted.
Intersubjectively
controlled data are
often seen as
trivia.
Pragmatism
Relevant:
Information about
goals and values
and consequences
both involving the
researcher and the
object of research
(subject and
object).
Low priority (or
outright suspicion)
is given to claimed
value-free or
neutral informa-
tion. For example,
feminist episte-
mology is
suspicious about
the neutrality of
information
produced in a
male dominated
society.
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As can be seen from this table, the question of “Social And Cultural Aware-
ness and Responsibility” goes to the heart of epistemological theories.
While “empiricism” and “rationalism” try to avoid such issues, pragmati-
cism explicitly considers them a central part of scientific method. His-
toricism takes a stand in the middle in considering contexts (and thus
tends to reflect cultural awareness). It should be mentioned that this clas-
sification of epistemologies is a crude one. It should also be mentioned
that some epistemologies may be better suited for some domains, while
other epistemologies may be more relevant for other domains. One should
not, however, confuse positivism (or empiricism) with science. Positiv-
ism is a theory about science as well as other domains, and it is today
generally regarded a problematic theory of science.
While empiricism and rationalism are foundational, historicism and
pragmaticism are anti-foundational theories. They do not try to establish
absolute procedures or methods for gathering knowledge, but they find
that some epistemologies may be harmful and should be corrected. Koch
(21, 22) introduced the concept of epistemopathology as a harmful theory
on how to establish knowledge. This is very much the same idea that was
developed by the Swedish-Danish physician and philosopher Poul Bjerre
(23). In their view, a person or a research program may be healthy or ill.
Medical science should not primarily develop theories on how to develop
health but how to cure specific kinds of illness. In much the same way
epistemology should not prescribe how to make good science, but should
instead keep to the more modest aim to avoid certain kinds of mistakes in
research.
Different research methods, methodologies, and epistemologies are
not neutral. They are not neutral regarding their ontological presupposi-
tions. The experimental method is, for example, considered very success-
ful in “psychological” social psychology. This method has, however, a
very special understanding of the word “social.” As shown by Danziger
(24), this method can only be used for investigating social effects that are
proximal, local, short-term and decomposable. The method presupposes
a limited and special understanding of social ontology. Nor are methods
neutral regarding the kind of knowledge produced and the kind of inter-
est served. Of course, the political aspects of selecting research methods
are much more indirect and hidden and difficult to reveal than is the di-
rect engaging in or avoidance of specific research questions.
How are the relations between research methodology and political
conviction to be formulated? Andersen’s is perhaps the first empirical
investigation of this question. He writes:
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The predominant trend in the social sciences during the past few de-
cades, however, has obviously been to ascribe the empirical-analytical
positions and ideals from the “hard” natural sciences with a stigma of
right-wing conservatism, and to associate the “soft” ideals from the
humanities and hermeneutics with the left” (Andersen, 1, p. 100).
It should be mentioned, however, that this picture is not static. When
logical positivism flourished at the beginning of the 20th century, it was
seen by many as progressive, whereas holistic views (e.g., gestalt psy-
chology) were at that time often seen as being reactionary. What may
serve conservative interests in some cultures may serve progressive func-
tions in other cultures. Before the Reformation, the Pope defended a real-
ist philosophy that implied that only he and the Catholic Church were
qualified to interpret the Bible. He fought against the nominalist view
that an individual person could do his own interpretation. At that time
nominalism can be seen as having a progressive tendency. However, in
the 20th century this may be reversed. People are more isolated from
interpretative communities and exposed to mass media. The tendency to
neglect a deeper reality behind the surface of immediate perception may
now serve a status quo. The classical philosophical problem concerning
realism versus nominalism represented in the Middle Age (and repre-
sents also today) an important political question. So, a conclusion may be
that the political role and consequences of different methodologies and
epistemologies are not constant but are culturally relative.
How then, can we explain the present tendency, in at least some coun-
tries, to ascribe to the empirical-analytical positions and ideals from the
“hard” natural sciences a stigma of right-wing conservatism, and to asso-
ciate the “soft” ideals from the humanities and hermeneutics with the
left? I shall try to explain this in the way I understand these connections.
One example from librarianship might be to see the services of li-
braries from the perspective of enlightenment versus a commercial per-
spective. In the latter case, users are considered customers, in the former
case, they are perhaps considered to be like explorers or “researchers.”
These perspectives will suggest very different research questions and re-
search methods. The customer perspective will tend to be associated with
best-seller statistics, empirical surveys of “information needs and uses,”
and related methods, while the enlightenment perspective tends to focus
less on empirical studies of users’ behavior and more on trends and quali-
ties in the published literature and the production of information associ-
ated with historical and theoretical studies and hermeneutical
interpretations.
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More generally, empirical-analytical positions and ideals from the
“hard” natural sciences tend to be associated with a stigma of right-wing
conservatism because these methods tend to describe a status quo in soci-
ety, while the “soft” ideals from the humanities and hermeneutics tend to
be associated with the left because they tend to question the assumptions
about “the given”. They tend, for example, to question the relations be-
tween what is quality and what is most visible in the market. They also
tend to examine information needs, relevance criteria, user behavior etc.
as determined by socio-cultural factors, whereas the more positivistic
methods tend to associate such concepts with individual characteristics
(often indirectly supposed to be connected with physiological character-
istics), thus preferring methodological individualism for methodological
collectivism/holism.
In other words, even on the methodological plane, there exists a con-
nection between the liberal view that each person is mainly responsible
for his own fate and positivist methods. On the other side is the socialist
view that each person’s fate is mainly determined by economic, political
and social forces, and “critical” methodologies such as hermeneutics and
discourse analysis. If this is the case, how can we obtain objectivity in
science? Many (post)modern epistemologists do not find that science
should aim at objectivity. There is a tendency to associate the positivist
positions and ideals with attributes such as “hard” and “objective,” whereas
ideals from the humanities and hermeneutics are associated with “soft-
ness” and “subjectivity”. This is in my opinion a wrong and harmful con-
fusion.
First, it is important to realize that subjectivity is not the logical op-
posite of objectivity:
We shall not dwell at such length on the notion of subjectivity, insofar
as it refers to the opinions, beliefs, and feelings of conviction of this or
that individual. Let us mainly note that this is not in any way the logical
opposite of objectivity. People said to be “reasonable” or “sensible”
will often give their (subjective) agreement to a well-corroborated (ob-
jective) statement such as “when an apple becomes detached from a
tree, it falls down and does not fly towards the stars.” In that sense,
obviously, any probabilistic statement, insofar as some individual ex-
presses his support for it, can always be said to be subjective. But this
does not exclude a priori its objectivity. An objective law, such as the
law of universal attraction, insofar as I believe it to be “true” can also
be said to be subjective, since it does, in fact represent my personal
opinion. (25, p. 26–27).
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Best (26) conclude his review of Harding (27): “As Harding ably shows,
the politicization and pluralization of knowledge is not necessarily a threat
to (strong) objectivity, but one of its preconditions.” This quotation is
important. It says that what are often regarded as soft, subjective methods
are in reality a precondition for “strong objectivity.” Harding seeks to
replace the “weak objectivity” of the male-dominated scientific world—
a pseudo-objectivity riddled with value-laden theories, political biases,
domineering interests, commodified research, and blinkered ethical vi-
sion—with the “strong objectivity” that comes only from a ‘robust re-
flexivity” attained through a rigorous self-scrutiny of one’s socio-
epistemological starting point. Harding notes that the very concept of
“value-free knowledge” is oxymoronic since the goal of being disinter-
ested is an interest in itself, and it allows science to separate fact from
value and abrogate responsibility for its actions. Since “value-free”” theo-
ries are impossible, Harding argues, one might as well acknowledge the
values that inform one’s research, be it to make money or to improve the
lives of the sick, debate their comparative validity, and struggle to have
science informed by progressive interests.
An Example From LIS Research:
Algorithms For Information Retrieval
LIS research is very heterogeneous. It spans issues related to computer
science to classification to cultural studies and the study of information
behavior of high school students. Few people have examined the ethical
basis of LIS-research, Frohmann (28) being an important exception. I
shall try to explicate the consequences of the epistemological principles
outlined above by discussing an example from the “hard” end of the spec-
trum of LIS studies.
We all use Internet search engines and are rather impressed by their
capabilities. How does the question of social and cultural awareness and
responsibility relate to their principles and design? Is this not a purely
technological problem where questions of values and goals are misplaced?
In general, when an algorithm retrieves something, other things are
left behind. Now, if an algorithm ranks a page high, other pages are ranked
low. In both cases the algorithms provides priority to what should be
visible and what should remain invisible to the user. In practical reality
the programmers of the algorithm have made a decision about what should
be available to the user. This is a highly political decision with many levels.
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One level is whether the retrieval process should be controlled and
understood by the users, or if it should be performed behind the back of
the user. “Classical” bibliographical databases allowed such user control
to a large degree, but were not considered “user friendly.” Most research-
ers, however, do not realize that both kinds of systems  are  "user friend-
ly" but are so in different ways.  They do not recognize that  the concept
of  user-friendliness  is not a  neutral  concept,  but  involves  a  dilemma
between an immediately easy search versus a search in which the user
has to invest some time learning the system, but in return is able to gain a
more conscious and controlled search.
Another issue is related to unequal access to different kinds of infor-
mation. According to Lawrence and Giles (29), search engines on the
Internet are typically more likely to index sites that have more links to
them (more “popular” sites). They are also typically more likely to index
US sites than non-US sites (AltaVista is mentioned as an exception), and
more likely to index commercial sites than educational sites. This may or
may not be the result of deliberate decisions made by the systems design-
ers and owners. From a scientific and democratic point of view, it is of
course essential to reveal such bias in information systems which, by the
way, also may have a strong presence in ordinary scientific information
systems. In the social sciences, for example, journals from the develop-
ing countries seems to be neglected in the dominant databases (30).
Even if the issues mentioned above were taken into consideration,
research in IR would still be based on epistemologies that claim neutral-
ity, but are not neutral. Julian Warner (31) takes a step toward considering
inherent weaknesses in current approaches to Information Retrieval. I
think he is right in making the point that the IR-tradition has been built on
the assumption that the system should provide a set of records that satisfy
a query. What an IR system in his view should do is to enlarge the users’
capacity for informed choice between the representations of objects in
the given universe of discourse. “Such an enhanced capacity for informed
choice broadly corresponds to exploratory capability. It should also be
regarded as analogous to a sense of cognitive control over, or ability to
discriminate between, representations of objects” (31, p. 36).
The capacity of different forms of classification to contribute to such
discriminatory powers should be considered relative to other kinds of
subject access apart from traditional classification codes (32). As we try
to demonstrate in our research review, there is no reason to presume that
a given access point should have a fixed (constant or universal) informa-
tional value across different domains, discourses, or paradigms. Whereas
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traditional IR-research considers a match between query words and words
in document-representations to be independent or constant in languages,
the domain analytic approach considers the semiotic systems to be adapted
to different tasks. For example, in constructing an algorithm for IR, we
do not consider the same algorithm to be equally efficient for different
kinds of questions. Certain kinds of questions are better served by algo-
rithms utilizing descriptors and title words, while other kinds of ques-
tions are better served by algorithms utilizing reference retrieval. In
chemistry, for example, it may be the case that questions concerning meth-
ods to produce chemicals are better served by reference retrieval while
questions about specific substances are better served by algorithms based
on controlled vocabulary (cf., Seglen, 33). In other words: different algo-
rithms must utilize different access points, and different access points are
more suited to some kind of questions, whereas other access points are
more suited to other questions. Different algorithms thus are differently
suited to different kinds of questions. One may ask if a given algorithm is
thus better suited for some kinds of questions compared to other ques-
tions, and to demand to know in what way algorithms are making policy
choices. What kind of policy different algorithms are serving can only be
uncovered by research.
This conclusion is very much in line with findings of Introna &
Nissenbaum (34), who argue that search engines raise not merely techni-
cal issues but also political ones. Their study of search engines suggest
that search engines systematically exclude (in some cases by design and
in some cases accidentally) certain sites, and certain types of sites, in
favor of others, systematically giving prominence to some at the expense
of others. They argue that such biases, which would lead to a narrowing
of the Web’s functioning in society, run counter to the basic architecture
of the Web as well as the values and ideals that have fuelled widespread
support for its growth and development. They consider ways of address-
ing the politics of search engines, raising doubts whether, in particular,
the market mechanism can serve as an acceptable corrective.
Conclusion: I have argued above that algorithms are never neutral
and that it is wrong to regard questions about the development of infor-
mation systems as neutral. Some kinds of bias are unavoidable, but this
should not be regarded as problematic as long as social and cultural aware-
ness and responsibility are considered in their construction. The impor-
tant thing is to bring pragmatic and ethical criteria into the heart of LIS.
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Relevance and Users’ Information Needs:
Who Is In Control?
The concepts of relevance and users’ information needs are central con-
cepts in LIS. No research or practice can be carried out without consider-
ing what is relevant and what the users’ information needs are. One cannot
buy a document for a library or index one in a database without involving
problems related to these concepts. They can, however be defined and
understood in very different ways with very different consequences for
social and cultural awareness and responsibility. The two concepts are
deeply related, because when we claim that some documents or informa-
tion is relevant to a user, we automatic claim that the user needs this
information—and vice versa.
The dominating trend in LIS is to measure relevance and informa-
tion needs and to base these measures on the individual or on a (potential)
user group. By doing so, the concepts have become psychologized. Su-
perficially this may sound progressive. A deeper reflection will reveal,
however, that this need not be the case. Indirectly such an approach sup-
ports dominant views and commercialism at the expense of enlighten-
ment and critical understanding. Relevance is an objective concept that is
not identical with the subjective concept of relevance assessments. A user
may, for example, change his view of what is relevant to a certain prob-
lem based on deeper knowledge of the issue in question. This distinction
between objective and subjective relevance and needs is very important
but is mostly neglected in the literature (possibly because it is so easy to
make empirical research based on user surveys) (35).
When a user searches for information about some issue, he or she is
confronted with many knowledge claims and information sources. As
argued in the previous sections, these knowledge claims cannot be seen
as neutral, but reflect different values, interests, and “paradigms.” What
the user needs then is not so much a direct answer to his or her needs as to
be informed about different possibilities. He or she needs some kind of
metadata that makes it possible to navigate consciously in the ocean of
information utilizing even small cues that may help determine the quality
and inherent values in the available information.
Traditional views of users and relevance criteria tend to see the user
as an isolated person in relation to the information searched for (dual-
ism), and the information as factual and true. More social and culturally
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oriented views see the user as part of different discourse communities
and thus more or less influenced by different viewpoints, which always
affect what information is sought. In this case the user’s ability to formu-
late questions is more or less determined by influences from discourse
communities and paradigms. Because of this, information systems can-
not just be seen as neutral tools to answer questions, but should also be
seen as tools to help formulate questions (and not just the way this is
approached in typical studies of query expansion). Social and cultural
awareness and responsibility imply the need for a mapping of basic views
and  values  related to a  potential question.  In  other  words:  users need
help to identify basic paradigms and epistemologies in the information
sought. This changes the study of user needs and relevance from “cogni-
tive science” to social and philosophical studies of knowledge produc-
tion and dissemination (as, for example “discourse analysis”).
Conclusion: Traditional research in LIS focuses on the users’ rel-
evance criteria and information needs. This seems to bring the user in
control in relation to his or her own information supply. However, be-
cause such studies overwhelmingly are based on assumptions about hu-
man beings related to behaviorism, this impression is not correct.
Information needs are not essentially “empty containers” that can be iden-
tified by studying the individual. Students normally cannot express their
educational needs and thus their information needs. Such needs are nor-
mally determined by teachers and by the educational policy in a society.
Information needs are needs to solve some problem for which knowledge
has been produced. There may exist consensus regarding the relevance of
given information to given problems, or there may exist different theo-
ries or paradigms with conflicting views. In order to give the user influ-
ence over his own information provision, such knowledge should be
communicated to him. If this is not done, the user can only formulate
questions from his present position without knowing alternative possi-
bilities. The user may falsely be convinced that his question was adequate
because it was able to extract an answer from the system. These answers
may, however, all be limited to a view or paradigm already contained in
the question—without the user being aware of this.
Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that questions relating to Social And Cul-
tural Awareness and Responsibility are central to Library, Information
and Documentation Studies. They are deeply related to the basic func-
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tions of libraries, documentation, and information systems. They are deeply
related to the core concepts of the discipline, and they are deeply related
to any discourse about methods for knowledge production and dissemi-
nation.
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